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In the 1970s, a trial by jury was rare in patent cases. By the time Chief Judge
Markey left the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1989, jury
trials had become the norm. Throughout Judge Markey's time on the bench he
exerted great energy to promote, define, and improve the role of law juries in patent
cases. This speech by Judge Markey's former law clerk, John R. Alison, discusses the
three Markey Principles. The first principle of Judge Markey is the fundamental
right to a jury trial in patent cases. Second, proceedings in jury trials for patent
cases should be actively managed just like all other civil trials. Last, the third
Markey principle states that a balance should be struck between the right to jury
trials in patent cases and the role of the jury.
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*

Thank you very much, Richard. I greatly appreciate the introduction. We're
going to try to do things a little differently in this panel. It's a more interactive
format, and we sure hope it's going to work.
To begin-it is a difficult and daunting task to attempt, in a simple 15 minute
period, a summary of Chief Judge Markey's efforts to promote, define, and improve
the role of lay juries in patent cases. It is a subject on which he frequently wrote and
spoke throughout his judicial career-on which he spoke freely, and with deep
conviction, with both his judicial colleagues and his clerks. When Chief Judge
Markey began working as a Unites States Judge in the 1970s,1 he could state from
experience-as he did in one of his earliest published speeches, entitled Special
Problems in Patent Case 2 -that "it is rare to have a jury in a patent case." 3 Yet, by
the time he left the bench in 1989, jury trials in patent cases had become common,
and now are the norm. According to the last Federal Circuit Bench and Bar survey
I've read, more than 65% of all patent trials now involve juries.4 One might say, "it is
rare today not to have a jury in a patent case." This thirty-year evolution in judicial
and attorney thinking about juries in patent cases is absolutely remarkable.
The Markey doctrine on jury trials can perhaps be simplified into three basic
principles. The first Markey principle-which he believed with deepest convictionwas that the right to a trial by jury in patent cases was fundamental to the patent
holder's civil rights-and that such right shall be preserved under the 7th
Amendment and should not be rationedin civil actions. The second Markey principle
is that proceedings in patent jury trials should be actively managed like all other
civil trials,by the judges and the lawyers who participate in them. And the third
Markey principle-balancing and complementing the first two-is that the federal
courts need to strike a pragmatic balance between the right to jury trial in patent
cases, and the corresponding role of the jury in determining the range of issues
presented in patent cases, and the need to protect other important Federal
interests-such as excepted subject matter (e.g., Hatch-Waxman disputes involving
abbreviated new drug applications), the ultimate determination of equitable issues
by the district court, and trial judge's legal responsibility to construe claims at issue.
Let's turn to the first of the three Markey principles I've just outlined-that the
right to jury shall be preserved and shall not be rationed in civil cases.
To gain insight and a basic appreciation for Chief Judge Markey's views on the
* Mr. Alison served as law clerk to Chief Judge Howard T. Markey from May 1984 through
August 1986. He is a partner at Finnegan Henderson Farabow Garrett & Dunner, LLP.
1 Sherman L. Cohn, Howard T Markey, 1 J. Fed. Cir. Hist. Soc'y 7, 9 (2007) ("On May 3, 1972,
President Nixon nominated Howard T. Markey to be the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals.").
2 Howard T. Markey, SpecialProblemsin Patent Cases, 66 F.R.D. 529 (1975).
3Id. at 545.
4 Cf Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the
BlackBox, 11 FED. CIR.B.J. 209, 210 (2001) (stating that "from 1997 to 1999, 59% of all patent trials
were tried to juries").
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necessary role of juries in patent cases, we can look first at two basic teaching cases,
Conne]] v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,5 which was the first patent jury case reviewed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and Chief Judge Markey's
additional views in SRI International v. Matsushita Electric Corp.,6 an in banc
decision that issued during an interesting period in the Federal Circuit's evolution in
the mid-1980s.
In Conne]], Chief Judge Markey, writing for a three judge panel, affirmed the
trial court's grant of judgment as a matter of law that overturned a jury verdict in
favor of plaintiff-patentee Connell. 7 The trial court had submitted a jury form for a
general verdict, supported by fifteen special written interrogatories under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a).8 The jury found for Connell, both as to validity and
infringement of claims to a hair "teasing and unsnarling implement." 9 The trial
court overturned the jury verdict on both grounds.' 0 On appeal, Connell had argued
that the trial court's judgment as a matter of law order, in effect, substituted the trial
court's view of the evidence for the facts found by the jury and had deprived him of
the right to a jury trial.1 1
Although Chief Judge Markey disagreed with Connell's ultimate argument, his
opinion agreed with (and expressly found for) Connell on a series of underlying
issues, vigorously reaffirming Connell's fundamental right to a jury trial.12 The key
insight provided by Judge Markey's opinion emerges from his balancing of the
Constitutional jury rights-which clearly assumes primacy-with judicial procedures
intended both to protect those rights while avoiding an unjust outcome.' 3
Chief Judge Markey's organized his affirmance of the trial court's order in the
form of an Aristotelian dialectic.' 4 As his thesis, he acknowledged that "[t]he
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury in suits
at common law and also provides that United States Courts shall not re-examine
facts tried by jury except under the rules of common law." 15 He further emphasized,
moreover, that following the merger of law and equity under the Federal Rules, the
judicial practice of "[p]ermitting the jury to draw legal conclusions based on the jury's
fact findings and reached in light of instructions on the law" also "has been preserved
as part of the right."16 Note, however, Judge Markey's stealth insertion of a judicial
management component ("in light of the instructions") into his broad affirmation of
the constitutional right to jury trials in patent cases. This is vintage Markey
5 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.).
6 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (in banc) (Market, C.J.).
7 Connell, 722 F.2d at 1555.

8 Id. at 1545.
9 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 559 F. Supp. 229, 232 (N.D. Ala. 1983), affd in part,722
F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see Connell, 722 F.2d at 1545.
10 Connel, 559 F. Supp. at 250; see Connell, 722 F.2d at 1545.
11Connel, 722 F.2d at 1553-54.
12Id.at 1546.
13Id. at 1546-47.
14ROBIN SMITH, ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2007) (2000) (stating
that "a view of dialectic as argument directed at another person by question and answer and
consequently
taking
as
premises
that
other
person's
concessions"),
available at
http ://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/.
15Connell, 722 F.2d at 1546.
16Id. (emphasis added).
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reasoning: first, affirm the primacy of individual rights; second, impose systemic
judicial checks upon the exercise and interpretation of those rights; and third, find
balance to avoid unjust results. And, indeed, by way of illustration, immediately
after acknowledging the jury's right to draw legal conclusions based on the facts and
the trial court's instructions, Judge Markey reaffirms that although the trial court
"remains ultimately responsible for upholding the law applicable to the facts," the
trial court is not authorized to "substitute its view for that of the jury when to do so
17
would be an effective denial of the right to trial by jury."
In SRI, Chief Judge Markey wrote separately to address whether the
constitutional right to a jury trial in patent cases was subject to a "complexity
exception."18 The underlying case arose on appeal from a grant of summary
judgment of noninfringement to the accused infringer Matsushita. 19 Although
plaintiff/patentee SRI had timely filed a jury demand, the trial court had
discontinued preparations for jury proceeding and then converted those preparations
into the preparations for a bench trial. 20 At the bench trial, he granted summary
judgment to the defendant in the case. 21 During the process, the judge stated that
had he didn't "see any factual issues that would be proper for a jury" and that, in the
22
absence of an evidentiary conflict, he did not "see a jury issue in a patent case."
Those two statements captured Chief Judge Markey's entire attention when
23
reviewing the case.
At the outset of his "Additional Views," Chief Judge Markey rejected the
suggestion (which he detected in the trial court's summary judgment) that the
Federal Circuit had in any way changed the course of the patent law such that
special rules and procedures applied to the management of patent cases. 24 He saw,
moreover, in the district court's management of the evidence relating to "factual
issues" a strong suggestion that, for efficiency's sake, complex evidentiary matters
were better off being resolved by the Court than by a jury.25 He therefore wrote his
"Additional Views," to reaffirm, at length, the primacy of the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial in patent cases on all issues of fact and law.
He observed, in particular, that one federal appellate court and three federal
district courts had either remanded or struck jury demands in "complex" civil
actions. 26 The basic tenant of that view was the perception (both before bench and
bar) that legally or economically complex issues had become too complex for decision
by lay jurors and should therefore be tried to a single judge. 27 That precept, he said,
ignored the fact that lay juries were routinely called on to decide highly complex
17 Id.
18 SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Markey, C.J.,
additional views).
19 Id. at 1111 (majority opinion).
20 Id. at 1112-14.
21SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 591 F. Supp. 464, 474 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 775
F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cr. 1985).
22SRJI-ntl, 775 F.2d at 1113-14.
23See id. at 1126 (Markey, C.J., additional views).
24 Id.
25Id. at 1126-27.
26 Id.at 1127.
27 See, e.g., Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practiceat the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 51-53 (1980).
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factual and economic cases, in both civil and criminal cases, and were in most cases
28
rigorously reviewed and upheld upon subsequent judicial review.
Although not explained in his opinion, Chief Judge Markey's focus on the
strength of jury verdicts was based on solid empirical footing.
Before his
appointment to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"),
Howard Markey actively litigated patent cases in the federal courts, bringing to his
judgeship a wealth of direct personal experience. 29 During his years as Chief Judge
of the CCPA, he frequently sat by designation as a panel member of the eleven
regional circuit courts of appeals. 30 Indeed, by 1984 he could confidently claim to
have sat with every sitting appeals court judge in the United States. 3 1 He also had
been designated to try intellectual property cases in several circuits, and therefore
could claim personal familiarity with the appellate scrutiny given to trial judges,
32
with whom he felt a particularly strong bond.
During his early years on the bench, Chief Judge Markey said that he routinely
sent an informal "survey letter" to all sitting trial judges asking the following four
questions (which I recreate from memory, with a view to recapturing the substance of
our discussions): (1) How many civil and criminal jury trials have you presided over
during the past year? (2) In what percentage of the verdicts rendered by the jury,
would you have voted in the same manner arrived at by the jury? (3) In those
instances where you would have voted differently from the jury, in what percentage
did you believe that the jury's decision was plainly reasonable? (4) In those instances
where you did not believe that the jury's decision was plainly reasonable, in what
percentage did you grant a motion for JNOV or a new trial?
In our conversations during his preparation of materials used in his Additional
Views, Chief Judge Markey recalled that-year upon year-the trial judges who
responded to his letter reaffirmed that they would have "voted with the jury" more
than 90 percent of the time. In those instances where the presiding judge stated that
he or she would have voted differently from the jury, Chief Judge Markey said the
presiding judge found the jury's verdict plainly reasonable in more than 50 percent of
the cases in question. And in those instances where the presiding judge did not find
the jury's verdict plainly reasonable, Chief Judge Markey said the presiding judge
granted judgment as a matter of law or a new trial about 50 percent of the time. He
remarked during our discussions that his informal survey was consistent with
federal judicial workload statistics reflecting both trial and appellate review of jury
cases.

33

In sum, Chief Judge Markey's real life experience-as a lawyer litigating patent
cases, as a district court judge, and as an appellate judge-firmly convinced him that
the American jury system provided a strong vehicle for deciding complex civil and
F.2d at 1130-31.
Cohn, supra note 1, at 9.
30 See id. at 10.
28 SRIIntl, 775
29 See
31

Jd

32 See

Poole v. Mossinghoff, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 506 (D.D.C. 1982) (Markey, C.J.) (sitting by
designation); Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D.D.C. 1978) (Markey, C.J.) (sitting by
designation).
33 See JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES

COURTS:

2007

ANNUAL

REPORT

OF

THE

DIRECTOR

http ://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.

13

(2007),

available at
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criminal cases. Moreover, where the presiding judge was convinced that the jury had
4
made a mistake, procedural vehicles clearly existed to avoid an unjust resultY
Judge Markey's "Additional Views" in SRI forcefully rejected the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial "was never 'intended' to extend to certain 'complex
cases' of today," and that a "better system" would focus social resources upon
experts.35 Judge Markey believed that "[t]he call for injection of 'expertise' into our
jurisprudence can be as alluring, and as fatal, as the sirens' song" and rejected
reliance on what he called "juriscience" and the expertise of specialized courts (which,
theoretically, also might exclude lay judges as triers of patent cases).36 Moreover,
whatever the academic merits of the discussion, the plain language of the Seventh
Amendment clearly trumped contemporary concerns regarding "the practical abilities
and limitations of juries." 37 Judge Markey's "Additional Views" also rejected the
suggestion then advanced in the academic literature 38 that a conflict may exist
between the Seventh Amendment, on the one hand, and the due process provisions of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, on the other hand.3 9 In response, he stated
that "[t]he argument confuses the route with the destination, for 'due process' is just
that, a process. It is an important and constitutionally required process. It is not a
result."40 Moreover, he clearly viewed a decisional approach that caused portions of
the Constitution to cancel one another as a path to anarchy: "judges are nowhere
authorized to exercise their personal predilection by revising or repealing the
Seventh Amendment.... To permit a judicial interpretation of a constitutional
provision that destroys another constitutional provision is to place at risk the entire
4
Constitution."'
The real problem in requiring lay jurors to decide technical issues in patent
cases, in Chief Judge Markey's view, was not to be found in the technical complexity
of patent matters. Rather, the challenge lay in promoting the effective management
of patent trials to simplify and appropriately present evidence to the jury.42 The
academic issue of complexity, in his view, was secondary to the need for pretrial and
trial proceedings identifying and focusing key issues for the jury, and also developing
a clear record for eventual review on appeal (if any were required)43 If the Seventh
Amendment lays the foundation stone for Chief Judge Markey's approach to jury
trials in patent cases, strong principles of trial management-along the lines
discussed above-clearly forms ground floor. We now turn to this second of the three
e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
35SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1127-28 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Markey, C.J.,
34See,

additional views).
36 Id. at 1129.

37Id. (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)); ci Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 ("The
Seventh Amendment ...depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of
the overall action.").
38 Jeffrey Oaks, Comment, The Right to Strike the Jury TrialDemand in Complex Litigation,
34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243, 289 (1980); Douglas W. Ell, Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury:

ProtractedCommercialLitigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775 (1978); see in
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980).
39SRIInt', 775 F.2d at 1127-28 (Markey, C.J., additional views).
40 Id. at 1128.
41
Id. at 1128-29.
42
Id.at 1131-32.
43Id.
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Markey principles for a more detailed exploration of his thinking.
Chief Judge Markey's judicial philosophy on promoting the effective
management of patent jury trials clearly predates the Constitutional doctrines
explored in SRI and later cases. An excellent teaching case in E.i. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co.,44 is found in an opinion authored by Chief Judge
45
Markey while sitting by designation in the Eighth Circuit.
Ironically, as in Connell,Judge Markey's judicial support for patent jury trials
46
in du Pont arises in the context of a decision vacating and remanding a jury verdict.
Plaintiff patentee, du Pont, accused Berkley of infringing claims to a fishing line
containing a fluorescent dye. 47 At trial, the district court had summarily denied du
Pont's request that the jury render special verdicts identifying each of the issues
regarding the patentability and infringement of the accused line. 48 Instead, the trial
court submitted a form calling for a naked general verdict supported by three special
interrogatories relating solely to certain fraud issues. 49 The form of the verdict
plainly frustrated Chief Judge Markey: although the panel opinion politely held that
denial of du Pont's request for special verdicts and detailed interrogatories was not,
in itself, reversible error, it observed that use of these mechanisms might very well
have avoided a retrial (perhaps as an incentive for trial courts in future cases).50
In du Pont, Chief Judge Markey remarked that, whatever the considerations
and concerns that might be involved in current discussions of juries in complex
litigations, the use of interrogatories and special verdicts "from which the parties and
an appellate court may glean the basis for the verdict, would appear to alleviate at
least some of those concerns in some cases."5 1 In point of fact, Chief Judge Markey
bemoaned the fact that the appellate court in du Pont had been called upon to review
"an entire 4000 page record" to resolve "over 25 issues and subissues," encompassing
eleven allegations of reversible error, "[c]ouched in accusatory and turgid
terminology" supported by "numerous bits and pieces of conflicting testimony and
documentary evidence," from which appellate court was expected to "draw a plethora
of factual inferences." 52 Chief Judge Markey's frustration (and perhaps, well
concealed delight) in the mismanagement of the case by both the trial court and
counsel for both parties could not have been clearer.
Chief Judge Markey's decision in du Pont clearly "talked softly" to avoid
encroaching upon Eighth Circuit precedent. Yet, his subsequent opinion in the
Federal Circuit's Conne]] exhibited less restraint and greater scope on the issue of
"naked general verdicts."53 This time, having assumed nationwide jurisdiction over
all patent cases, Chief Judge Markey could observe that "[such] practice leav[es] a
wide area of uncertainty on review," and that "appellate judges have expressed grave
44 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980) (Markey, C.J.).

Id. at 1255.
at 1276.
47 Id. at 1255-56.
48 Id. at 1256 n.5.
49 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 204 U.S.P.Q. 594, 596 (N.D. Iowa 1979),
vacated in part,620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980).
50 See duPont,620 F.2d at 1256 n.5.
45

46 Id.

51

Id.

52 Id.

53

at 1256-57.
Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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concern over the use of the general verdict in civil cases." 54 Indeed, in Connell, the
Federal Circuit (having by then superseded the Eighth Circuit's review of trial
procedures in patent cases) held that "[s]ubmission of the obviousness question to the
jury should ...be accompanied by detailed special interrogatories designed to elicit
responses to at least all the factual inquiries enumerated in Graham [v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)], and based on the presentations made in the particular
55
trial."
In Conne]], Chief Judge Markey emphasized that while great deference was due
to a jury's fact findings in a civil case, that rule came with the proviso that such
deference, both the trial and on appeal, was not so great as to require the acceptance
of findings that were not supported by substantial evidence. 56 To avoid an unjust
outcome, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided both safeguards and
alternatives to manage and, if necessary, correct the jury's task of trying patent
cases. 5 7 Conne]] actively promoted, for instance, the use of special verdicts under
Federal Rule 49(a),58 and the complementary use of special verdicts accompanied by
answers to interrogatories under Rule 49(b), in managing patent jury trials.59 It paid
particular attention to the role of Rule 51(a) instructions as a "guide" to the jury's
deliberations.6 0 Indeed, Chief Judge Markey's panel opinion in Connel] expressly
"recommended" to trial courts (on pain of facing retrial) that the trial court's
submission of special interrogatories to the jury also be accompanied "at a minimum"
by instructions making clear that the jury "must consider the invention as a whole"
61
and that each member of the jury "must walk in the shoes of one skilled in the art."'
Finally, he pointed to the curative power of Rule 50(a) directed verdicts,6 2 the
authority to grant Rule 50(b) judgments as a matter of law,6 3 and further to grant
Rule 59(a) grants of new trials.6 4 These procedural safeguards, he observed, insured
both the parties and the judicial system against an improper outcome that might
65
occur from a "rogue elephant" jury that disregarded the rules.
In a March 24, 1987 speech, On Simplifying PatentTrials,6 6 Chief Judge Markey
again restated his views on the effective management in patent jury cases. Key to
his judicial approach was the belief that patent cases (whether tried to the bench or
to a jury) should be actively managed "like all other civil trials," in which he again
reiterated the universal applicability of the Federal Rules and the broad power of the

54Id

55Id at 1547.
56 Id. at 1546 ("Deference due a jury's fact findings in a civil case is not so great... as to
require acceptance of findings where ... those findings are clearly and unquestionably not
supported by substantial evidence. To so hold would be to render a trial and the submission of
evidence a farce.").
57 See Connell,722 F.2d at 1546.
58 FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a); Connel, 722 F.2d at 1546.
59FED. R. CIv. P. 49(b); Connell, 722 F.2d at 1546.
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 51(a); Connel, 722 F.2d at 1546.
61 Connel, 722 F.2d at 1547.
62 FED. R. CIv. P. 50(a); Connell, 722 F.2d at 1546.
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b); Connel, 722 F.2d at 1546.
64 FED. R. CIv. P. 59(a); Connell, 722 F.2d at 1546.
65 Connell, 722 F.2d at 1546.
66 Howard T. Markey, On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369 (1987).
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jury to decide questions of law and fact.6 7 Chief Judge Markey's increased focus on
jury issues in On Simplifying Patent Trials reflects, in itself, the increased
importance of jury trials in patent cases-an evolution caused, in no small part, by
68
his own decisions and writings promoting the role of juries in complex cases.
Finally, Chief Judge Markey also recognized limitations upon the types of issues
that were appropriate for consideration by a jury. This element of his judicial
philosophy illustrates his strong sense of a need to balance between the right to a
jury trial and other important Federal interests at play within the U.S. patent
system.
In Gardeo Manufacturing,Inc. v. HerstLighting Co.,6 9 which Joe Re will discuss
in greater detail during the next session, Chief Judge Markey authored a panel
opinion approving the trial court's separation (under Federal Rule 42(b)) of
inequitable conduct for "pre-trial" by the district court before a scheduled jury trial
on the liability and patent validity issues. 70 In affirming the district court's decision,
the panel rejected defendant Peerless's claim that the trial court's decision on
inequitable conduct effectively deprived it of a jury trial on the facts underlying the
71
purely equitable issue of inequitable conduct.
Similarly, in Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Industries, Inc.72-a
decision foreshadowing the Federal Circuit's decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Ine.73 -Chief Judge Markey authored a divided panel opinion vacating
and reversing a jury's infringement verdict, holding that the grounds for reversal (the
legal issue of claim construction) was not preempted by the jury's verdict.7 4 In a
dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Newman argued, with considerable force, that the
75
jury's infringement finding implied a verdict on an issue of law requiring deference.
Writing for the panel majority, however, Chief Judge Markey adhered to the
viewpoint-now universally accepted-that claim construction raised a question of
law for decision by the trial judge on a motion for judgment as a matter of law (and
on appeal).76 Thus, even though the jury verdict answered a legal question, "that
circumstance," in itself, could not relieve the trial judge or the Federal Circuit "of the
judicial duty to insure that the law [was] correctly [decided]." 77 Here, Chief Judge
Markey concluded that acceptance of the jury verdict necessarily would sanction in
78
the patentee's recapture of subject matter forfeited when obtaining the patent.
I thank you for your patience, and I yield to my colleagues on the panel and to
67 Id. at 371-72, 376. This speech also advocates for the increased, creative use of Rule 42(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to separate issues in patent trials for incremental decision,
urging the bench and bar to "try infringement separately." Id. at 377-78.
68 See, e.g., Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Markey, C.J.); Perkin-Elmer
Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Markey, C.J.); R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v.
A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Markey, C.J.).
69820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Markey, C.J.).
70 Id. at 1210-12.
71
Id.at 1211-13.
72 888 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Markey, C.J.).
7352 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), aiTd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
74 Senmed, 888 F.2d at 818, 821.
75Id. at 821-24 (Newman, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 818 (Markey, C.J.).

77Id.
78 Id.

at 818 n.6.
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your questions from the floor.

